By Walter L. Perry, John Gordon
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven that U.S. forces want more-effective options and approaches to behavior counterinsurgency. they are going to probably face related, abnormal struggle strategies from destiny enemies. This monograph examines the character of the modern rebel probability and offers insights on utilizing operational research concepts to aid intelligence operations in counterinsurgencies.
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Extra info for Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies
RAND Corporation, OP-178-OSD, 2007. 12 Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies situation, since a limited numbers of advisors had been shown to be inadequate. The present situations in Afghanistan and Iraq are somewhat diﬀerent because there were no local forces to be supported in those cases—they had already been swept away during the invasions of those countries. 4 This model is intended to portray how most insurgencies evolve over time. If the insurgents survive the vulnerable initial phase and start to gain strength, the relationship of the government’s police and military forces will start to change.
2 Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies The Focus on Conventional Operations Despite insurgency’s long history, the preference of most Western militaries has been to focus on conventional combat operations against the armed forces of another nation state. Indeed, the “corporate culture” of most Western armies, navies, and air forces is strongly biased toward preparation for major combat operations. That is certainly reﬂected in the spending patterns of the NATO nations today. Compared with the money devoted to new systems for high-intensity combat—whether aircraft carriers, ﬁghters, armored ﬁghting vehicles, or sensors intended primarily to locate and identify the platforms of an opponent—the amount invested in the preparation for “low-intensity combat,” “irregular warfare,” “counterinsurgency,” or whatever term one wishes to use, pales in comparison.
Intelligence Analysis 31 recent data so that when candidate factor values for a given observation are classiﬁed, the latest enemy tactic is accounted for. 2). Unlike in conventional operations where discerning enemy plans amounts to evaluating alternative courses of action, discerning enemy plans in an insurgency can be almost impossible at times because the enemy generally seizes opportunities to strike as they occur and because decisions occur at low levels and operations involve relatively few people and pieces of equipment.
Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies by Walter L. Perry, John Gordon